Making Smart Decisions About High-Speed Rail
Key Takeaways
- When you get it right, high-speed rail is a brilliant transport solution.
- However, many places are getting it wrong.
- To get it right at a strategic level, you need to:
Understand the broader strategic context
- Is it better than the alternatives?
- Are you falling for the shiny object syndrome?
- Should transport policy be reshaping settlement patterns?
- How might technological change affect the case for HSR?
- Do the environmental benefits justify the investment?
Choose the right line at the right time
- Do you have sufficient population anchors?
- Is there substantial existing demand to build on?
- Does the distance make economic and operational sense?
- Have you optimised the station strategy?
- Can you work with the geography or fight against it?
- Will stations integrate effectively with urban transport networks?
- Is the timing right for your context?
Prepare for Success
- Are you following the "think slow, act fast" principle?
- Do you have governance structures designed for success?
- Do you have the institutional capacity to deliver?
- Can you maintain political stability and policy continuity?
Introduction
Public Relations expert: “I don’t understand, I have been doing this job for 20 years, and every time we announce a very fast train, 95% of Australians are for it.”
Infrastructure Agency CEO: “And the other 5%?”
Public Relations expert: “Who are they?”
Infrastructure Agency CEO: “Engineers, economists, experts in transport”
From the Australian satirical program “Utopia”, episode “Is Australia Getting A High-Speed Train?”
This exchange perfectly captures a central challenge of high-speed rail (HSR) policy: the gap between public and political enthusiasm and the need for proper analysis. Few transport projects generate as much excitement as the promise of sleek trains racing between cities at 300km/h. Yet, given the problems around the world, HSR projects need to be carefully considered.
Having travelled on high-speed rail across Japan, China, and Europe, I can attest to their appeal. When they work well, they're transformative, offering a glimpse of what mobility could be in a world where distance becomes less of a constraint. The best HSR lines represent some of humanity's most impressive infrastructure achievements.
But enthusiasm for the technology shouldn't blind us to the strategic realities. The difference between HSR success and failure often comes down to whether the fundamentals are right: the right cities, connected at the right distance, with the right demand patterns, built at the right time with the right institutional capacity.
Recent events have made this distinction impossible to ignore. Some people in China are questioning whether their country massively overbuilt its HSR network. The UK's HS2 project has become a masterclass in how not to deliver major infrastructure, with costs spiralling and scope shrinking. California's HSR project has struggled with funding withdrawals and delivery challenges. Meanwhile, countries like Canada and Australia continue to debate HSR projects that have been on and off the agenda for decades.
These experiences offer valuable lessons. HSR can be brilliant when the stars align. The question is how to distinguish between contexts where HSR will thrive and those where it will become an expensive mistake.
Australia provides a useful case study in these complexities. Melbourne and Sydney are both substantial cities of around 5.5 million people, connected by one of the world's busiest air corridors. Yet they sit nearly 900 kilometres apart, a distance that challenges HSR economics. Canberra is much closer to Sydney at just under 300 kilometres, but with only 500,000 people, it does not generate the patronage that makes HSR a home run. If Melbourne were where Canberra is, Australia would likely already have high-speed rail.
This blog examines the strategic considerations that should guide HSR decisions. It's not about the technical aspects of building trains or the detailed project management challenges, important as those are, or whether the benefit-cost ratio (BCR) is above 1. Instead, it focuses on when HSR makes sense in the first place, and how to set projects up for success before the first sod is turned.
The stakes couldn't be higher. Get HSR right, and you can transform regional connectivity and urban development patterns for generations. Get it wrong, and you risk not just wasting enormous sums of money, but crowding out other transport investments that could have delivered far greater benefits for far more people.
Understanding the broader strategic context
Before examining the technical merits of any specific HSR proposal, decision-makers need to step back and consider the broader strategic landscape. Even a perfectly designed HSR line can be the wrong choice if it doesn't fit the wider transport and economic context. Here are the key strategic questions that should be answered first.
Is it better than the alternatives?
HSR projects typically cost tens of billions of dollars. This creates what economists call an opportunity cost problem: every dollar spent on HSR is a dollar not spent on something else. The relevant comparison isn't between HSR and doing nothing, but between HSR and the best alternative use of that money.
Consider Australia's situation. A Melbourne-Sydney-Brisbane HSR line will cost well over $100 billion. For the same amount, Australia could deliver significant public transport projects in all eight capital cities, build comprehensive cycling networks, and still have billions left over. Which approach would deliver greater benefits? That's the question responsible governments should be asking.
This isn't an argument against HSR per se, but for rigorous prioritisation.
Are you falling for the shiny object syndrome?
Images of sleek Japanese shinkansen or French TGV trains racing through countryside create powerful mental associations with progress and modernity. The mundane reality of incremental improvements to existing transport systems can't compete with that emotional appeal.
This creates dangerous political dynamics. Politicians know that announcing HSR generates headlines and enthusiasm in ways that announcing bus rapid transit or cycle lane networks never will. The satirical quote that opens this blog captures this perfectly: HSR polls well precisely because it appeals to aspirations rather than rigorous analysis.
Canada appears to be experiencing this phenomenon now, with reports suggesting HSR is being pursued not because it's the optimal transport solution, but because it tested well in focus groups. Similarly, if reports from China are accurate, their massive HSR construction program was driven partly by local officials competing to have the most impressive infrastructure in their regions.
The "shiny object" problem is compounded by what might be called "national hubris", the belief that serious countries must have serious infrastructure. This manifests in projects that promise to be "world-leading" or "world-class" regardless of whether that level of specification is actually needed. According to the Stewart review of HS2, this kind of hubris severely undermined cost control, with the project pursuing unnecessarily high specifications that added billions to the cost without proportional benefits.
Should transport policy be reshaping settlement patterns?
One sophisticated argument for HSR is that it can support more balanced regional development by making it viable to live in smaller cities while accessing opportunities in larger ones. In theory, this could reduce housing pressures in major metropolitan areas while revitalising regional centres.
This argument has appeal, but requires careful scrutiny. In genuinely dense cities where land constraints are severe and conventional transport extensions are not feasible, HSR connections to smaller centres might make sense.
However, in countries like Australia, Canada, and most of the United States, the major cities are far from dense by international standards. In these contexts, housing affordability problems typically stem from other constraints.
Moreover, the "regional development" argument often assumes that smaller cities connected by HSR are both willing and able to accommodate significant population growth. This isn't always true. Building HSR to places that aren't ready to grow is unlikely to achieve the hoped-for development outcomes.
How might technological change affect the case for HSR?
Transport planning requires making bets about the future, often 20-30 years into the future. The pandemic reminded us how quickly fundamental assumptions about travel behaviour can change. Pre-2020, few transport planners seriously considered scenarios where business travel would drop significantly due to remote working technologies.
The implications of technological change for HSR pull in different directions. Remote working might reduce commuting demand, weakening the case for HSR. But it might also make people more willing to live further from employment centres, potentially strengthening it. The net effect will likely vary by corridor and context.
More fundamentally, autonomous vehicles could reshape the competitive landscape for intercity travel. Currently, driving for three hours versus taking HSR for one hour represents a clear trade-off between time and comfort. But if autonomous vehicles become reliable mobile offices, that calculation changes significantly. An electric autonomous vehicle charged by home solar panels might offer door-to-door convenience at lower cost than HSR, while providing the private workspace that many business travellers prefer.
This doesn't mean HSR will become obsolete; high-capacity corridors will likely always need rail solutions. But it does suggest that HSR business cases need to avoid being overly optimistic about the future.
Do the environmental benefits justify the investment?
Climate change adds urgency to infrastructure decisions, and HSR advocates often position it as essential for decarbonisation. Electric trains powered by clean energy clearly produce fewer emissions per passenger-kilometre than aircraft or cars. This appears to be a compelling environmental argument.
However, the full environmental accounting is more complex. HSR construction generates enormous emissions through concrete production, steel manufacturing, and construction activities. These "embodied carbon" costs can be substantial.
More importantly, the climate case for HSR depends on the aviation and automotive sectors not significantly reducing their emissions. But both sectors are pursuing rapid decarbonisation through electric aircraft, hydrogen propulsion, and sustainable fuels. If aviation achieves substantial emissions reductions over the next two decades, HSR's climate advantage diminishes considerably.
The opportunity cost problem also applies to environmental policy. Could the money spent on HSR achieve greater emissions reductions if invested in urban public transport, active transport networks, or direct clean energy deployment? In many cases, the answer may be yes.
Choosing the Right Line at the right time
Once you've established that HSR makes strategic sense in your context, the next challenge is designing a line that can actually succeed. Many HSR projects fail because of the underlying demand patterns and geographic realities.
Do you have sufficient population anchors?
HSR economics depend heavily on having large population centres at each end of the line. This isn't just about total numbers, it's about the concentration of people who might reasonably use intercity rail service.
The population threshold isn't fixed; it depends on distance, existing travel patterns, and local context. But connections between cities of under 500,000 will struggle to generate sufficient patronage, while connections between cities over 5 million will probably succeed if other factors align. The challenging middle ground requires particularly careful analysis of demand patterns and growth projections.
Is there substantial existing demand to build on?
The most reliable predictor of HSR success is existing intercity travel demand. Routes with heavy air traffic, significant bus services, or congested highway corridors already demonstrate market demand for intercity connectivity. HSR can capture and expand this existing demand rather than trying to create entirely new travel patterns.
Does the distance make economic and operational sense?
Distance affects HSR economics in complex ways. Short routes struggle to justify the higher infrastructure costs of HSR. Long routes face increasing competition from aviation, which becomes more attractive as journey times extend.
Have you optimised the station strategy?
Station locations and frequencies present a fundamental trade-off in HSR design. More stations mean better accessibility and potentially higher ridership, but they also mean slower journey times and higher operating costs. Getting this balance right is crucial for success.
The pressure to add stations is intense. Every significant town along the route will lobby for HSR access, often with compelling arguments about economic development and equity. Politicians find it difficult to resist these pressures, especially when station construction can be portrayed as spreading the benefits of HSR investment.
Can you work with the geography or fight against it?
Geography is destiny for HSR projects. High-speed trains need relatively straight routes with gentle curves. This means that natural obstacles, such as mountains, rivers, urban areas, and environmentally sensitive regions, create significant challenges.
Each geographical challenge adds significantly to costs. Tunnelling through mountains or under cities is far more expensive than surface construction.
Environmental constraints add another layer of complexity. Routes through national parks, heritage areas, or ecologically sensitive regions face long approval processes and often require expensive mitigation measures. HS2's experience with protected bat habitats illustrates how environmental concerns can drive costs far above initial estimates.
Will stations integrate effectively with urban transport networks?
HSR stations are only as good as their connections to the places people actually want to go. A beautifully designed station in the middle of nowhere will struggle no matter how fast the trains. Successful HSR requires stations that integrate seamlessly with local transport networks and are located near major employment and activity centres.
This creates difficult trade-offs between construction costs and accessibility. Building stations in city centres is expensive because land is costly and construction is disruptive. Building stations on the urban periphery is cheaper but requires passengers to make additional journeys to reach their final destinations. The extra time and cost of these connections can eliminate much of HSR's competitive advantage.
Is the timing right for your context?
Even a well-designed HSR line can fail if built at the wrong time. Population and economic growth might justify HSR in the future, but building ahead of demand is a risky strategy.
Sometimes the smartest approach is to preserve corridors for future HSR while investing in less capital-intensive improvements today. Upgrading existing rail lines, improving bus services, or building dedicated busways can provide immediate benefits while keeping options open for HSR when conditions are more favourable.
Preparing for Success
Deciding to build HSR is only the beginning. The gap between announcement and successful operation typically spans 15-20 years, during which countless decisions will determine whether the project delivers on its promises or becomes a cautionary tale. While detailed implementation strategies are beyond the scope of this blog, several foundational elements must be established at the strategic level to give any HSR project a realistic chance of success.
Are you following the "think slow, act fast" principle?
Bent Flyvbjerg's research on megaprojects worldwide has identified a consistent pattern: projects that invest heavily in upfront planning and design deliver faster and more successfully than those that rush to construction. His "think slow, act fast" principle should be the golden rule for HSR development.
The temptation to shortcut planning is intense. Politicians want to break ground during their terms in office. Communities want to see construction activity. Media coverage focuses on when shovels will hit the ground rather than whether the project is properly prepared. But succumbing to these pressures is how projects end up with the cost blowouts and delivery delays that have plagued HS2, California HSR, and countless other infrastructure projects worldwide.
Do you have governance structures designed for success?
HSR projects require governance frameworks that can maintain strategic direction over decades while adapting to changing circumstances.
Megaprojects can fail because accountability is diffused across multiple agencies, levels of government, and private contractors. When everyone is responsible, no one is responsible. Successful projects establish clear lines of authority and hold specific individuals accountable for specific outcomes and are given the powers to succeed.
Do you have the institutional capacity to deliver?
Building HSR successfully requires specialised expertise that many countries simply don't possess. Countries starting HSR programs must balance building domestic capacity with relying on international expertise.
Workforce availability presents another dimension of the capacity challenge. HSR construction requires large numbers of skilled workers. Tight labour markets can drive up costs significantly and extend delivery timelines.
Can you maintain political stability and policy continuity?
Perhaps the greatest challenge facing HSR projects in democratic countries is maintaining political support over the decades required for planning, construction, and operation. Changes in government, political priorities, and public opinion can derail even well-designed projects.
The challenge is particularly acute when major opposition parties actively oppose HSR projects. Sometimes the honest answer is that political conditions aren't stable enough to support major infrastructure investment.
Conclusion
HSR represents one of the most seductive propositions in transport policy. The promise of sleek trains whisking passengers between cities at 300km/h captures imaginations and wins overwhelming public support. But as the troubled experiences of HS2, California's HSR project, and potentially China's overbuilt network demonstrate, good intentions and public enthusiasm are not enough.
Too often, the allure of HSR leads to backwards reasoning: starting with the desire for a high-speed train and then finding justifications, rather than starting with transport problems and rigorously evaluating whether HSR is the best solution. This is how you end up with projects that promise to be "world-leading" rather than fit-for-purpose, or lines built to places that aren't ready for them.
Before any government commits to HSR, they should honestly answer a few hard questions: Could the same money deliver greater transport benefits through other investments? Do the demographics and travel patterns genuinely support HSR? Can the project realistically be delivered given local political and institutional realities? Will it still make sense in 20 years given technological and social changes?
A poorly conceived HSR project doesn't just waste money; it can set back transport progress for decades by consuming resources that could have been used for projects that improve mobility for more people.
The world needs better transport systems. Sometimes that means HSR. More often, it means making the unglamorous but smart investments in the transport networks that serve everyday journeys. The key is having the wisdom to know the difference.